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   The topic of this paper may seem rather ambitious and ambiguous. After all, 
emotions affect every conscious action of an individual-and many of the 
unconscious ones as well. But this ambiguity and lack of boundaries serves a 
good purpose are here. 
   The broad concept "emotions" is useful for two reasons. First, it forces us to 
focus on real people. A nation, a government, or an international organization 
does not have emotions ; only people do. Yet, so much of academic writing-at 
least in the United States-uses such expressions as "Germany feels that ....... 
"the US Government is angry at Japanese trade practices," or "Beijing feels 
strongly that Taiwan belongs to China." Strictly speaking none of these 
expressions make much sense. More importantly, by using such language we 
tend to overlook significant psychological processes that affect the behavior of 
diplomats and other government officials involved in negotiations. 
   My second reason for exploring the role of emotions in international 
negotiation is that this broad approach stimulates. us to inquire into a wider 
range of issues. The very vagueness of the question allows us to come up with 
some new and perhaps interesting answers. In particular, I hope that by seeing 
negotiators as real people-people with emotions-we can shed some light on 
the changing role of nation-states and national governments in world affairs. By 
contrast, if we see sovereign countries as the ultimate international "actor," we 
will never notice how much the capacity of sovereign (or national) governments 
to act on anything depends on people and their sentiments and emotions. What 
enables a nation-state to be a so-called "actor" is the people who serve in its 
government as well as all the men and women who support the government as 
workers and warriors, as scientists and artists, as merchants and farmers. And it 
is all these people who together shape the actions of a nation-state and who are 
influenced by their hopes and fears, their feelings of loyalty or alienation, their 
sense of enthusiasm or despair. 
   Those of you who have had the patience to read some of the specialized 
academic literature from the United States dealing with international relations
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may have come across the debate between the so-called "realist" theory and the 
"liberal" or "institutional" theory. The "realist" theory emphasizes the tendency 
towards anarchy in international affairs and the reliance on balance of power 
arrangements. The "institutional" and "liberal" theories stress the possibility 
that international institutions can overcome the tendency to anarchy and that 
truly cooperative relations among liberal democracies are likely to overcome the 
risk of war. During the Cold War, the East-West confrontation and the US-
Soviet military balance of power imposed an order on the world that showed a 
close fit with the realist theory. The most famous statesman who sought to act 
in accordance with the "liberal" theory was US President Woodrow Wilson. But 
as a manifestation of a liberal-institutional concept of international order the 
European Union (which is regional, of course, but not global) has been far more 
successful than President Wilson's League of Nations.' 
   For our purposes here it is useful to distinguish two types of emotions : on 
the one hand, emotions that refer to, or are animated by, something in the future ; 
on the other hand, emotions that refer to, or animated by, something in the past. 
We will, however, pay little attention here to emotions that are linked to 
something that happens in the immediate present. For example, it will not 
interest us here that a diplomat may get angry because his opponent has just 
used offensive language. Similarly, it will not interest us that a negotiator may 
be more willing to make some concessions because he feels relaxed and in good 
spirits having just enjoyed a fine lunch and imbibed lots of sake.
Emotions Animated by Ideas about the Future 
   Let us first look at emotions referring to an event that is expected to occur 
in the future. These are the emotions of hope or fear, the emotions of yearning 
for some future success or of worrying about some future failure. In complex 
international negotiations these images about future outcomes and their 
follow-on consequences consist of many variables. For example, in trade 
negotiations these variables may include tariff levels for different goods, rules 
restricting government subsidies, adjustments of patent rights, agreed volumes
1 These few sentences cannot do justice to the richness of recent international relations writ-
 ings on the realist vs. liberal-internationalist views. For a recent sampling of contributions 
 see David A. Baldwin (editor), Neorealism and Neoliberalism : The Contemporary Debate (New 
 York : Columbia University Press, 1993). A stimulating discussions is offered by Stanley 
 Hoffmann, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism," Foreign Policy, Spring 1995, pp. 159-177. 
 Hoffmann makes several observations that are in agreement with a thesis of this paper ; 
 namely, his points on the importance of "emotional bonds of allegiance that tie the society to 
 the state" and on the loosening or severing of these ties in current ethnic and separatist crises.
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of trade, and so forth. Most of these variables are not commensurable, that is to 
say, the outcomes agreed for each of the variables cannot be added up to get a 
measurement for the overall outcome. Hence, the negotiators have to attach 
more or less arbitrary weights to these variables. They must decide, for example, 
whether their nation would benefit more if its principal trading partner 
improved the enforcement of patent rights or if it lowered certain tariffs. The 
way in which government officials prioritize such different issues depends on 
their emotional attachment to alternative outcomes-their concerns, hopes, and 
fears for the future. 
   In the so-called "armistice" negotiations that ended the Korean war in 1953, 
the issues included such disparate things as the return of prisoners of war, 
restrictions on armaments for North and South, and the structure and 
composition of an international arms inspection team (the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission). The American negotiators placed great hopes on this 
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. In their eyes it was an essential 
element of the armistice agreement that they had to win in order to prevent 
North Korea from violating the prohibitions against an arms build-up. As 
Americans soon learned, this Commission was worse than useless ; it could do 
nothing about North Korea's arms build-up in violation of the truce agreement, 
but it inhibited the US response. By contrast, the American negotiators invested 
much less effort in the dividing line between North and South, which-far from 
being a temporary armistice line-became a permanent border. Today this line 
is the most heavily armed border in the world. 
   This example illustrates an important tendency in American diplomacy. 
The negotiating tactics of US government officials in the Korean armistice talks 
reflect an emotional attachment to the liberal-institutional view of world order. 
The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was meant to make sure that the 
hard-won peace in Korea would last ; it was like a miniature version of the 
Wilsonian dream of the League of Nations, the organization that was meant to 
prevent another world war. Actually, it became obvious very quickly that this 
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was neither neutral (because Com-
munist Poland and Czechoslovakia together had half the votes), nor supervisory 
(because the North Koreans could easily block all relevant access). 
   While setting up this commission seemed to be a goal that the American 
negotiators valued, drawing the line for the territorial division between North 
and South Korea was emotionally an unappealing issue for American diplomats 
and hence something on which the US negotiators spent less effort and time. In 
the American view at end of World War II, the Korean peninsula was meant to 
become a unified country. The division between North and South that was
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hastily arranged in 1945 was meant to be a temporary compromise reached with 
Moscow in order to create separate Soviet and US occupation zones. 
   During the first phase of the negotiations on a nuclear test ban in the late 
1950s, US and British diplomats exhibited a similar attachment to institution-
building. As if motivated by a strange utopianism, the US-British side sought to 
superimpose a liberal-institutional structure on the Cold War reality of balance 
of power. They sought to create an elaborate "impartial" Control Organization 
intended to detect and confirm nuclear tests carried out in violation of the treaty. 
To act as a neutral arbiter, this organization would have had to float above the 
Cold War cleavage like some heavenly creature. Of course, nothing came of this 
idea. The Soviet negotiator at that time, Ambassador Tsarapkin, had no such 
illusions. "If any State were to take the step of violating the treaty and to start 
a series of nuclear explosions," Tsarapkin said, "such a State would of course 
never allow any inspection team to enter its territory." We should ask ourselves 
whether more recent arms control agreements with all their elaborate 
international inspection organizations-such as the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention-might not be similarly unrealistic. 
   In negotiations that might lead to the partitioning of a previously unified 
country, strong emotional preferences become involved on both sides of the 
issue. Minorities seeking independence will favor partition, those who wish to 
preserve an empire, or "national" unity, will fiercely oppose it. Interestingly, in 
many recent struggles about partition the American political elite had a strong 
dislike for the idea that a previously unified country should be broken up. Some 
intellectuals have suggested that the American memory of the terribly costly 
Civil War might explain this tendency ; others have argued that the emotional 
distaste for partition of American diplomats might stem from the realization that 
the United States itself is a country with many ethnic and racial groups. 
   Whatever the reason, this American tendency shows itself in many in-
stances. For example, when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991 into its con-
stituent administrative "republics," senior officials in the Bush administration at 
first hesitated to recognize these newly independent states. In the same year 
these senior US officials opposed the break-up of former Yugoslavia. And with 
the unfolding crisis Bosnia, this aversion to partitioning has manifested itself 
particularly strongly, even though Bosnia had never been a sovereign state with 
a unified territory but was merely an administrative division of Yugoslavia and 
before that, of the Ottoman empire. 
   The 1995 Dayton accords on Bosnia produced the detailed map of separation 
between territories with Serb military forces and under Serb political control, on 
one side, and territories with Muslim-Croat forces and under the political control
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of authorities in Sarajevo, on the other side. The negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, in 
the fall of 1995 that produce this map were inspired, led, and managed by 
American diplomats. Yet, in these negotiations-as well as during the several 
years of Bosnian warfare before them-the senior US officials unequivocally 
maintained that the separated territories of Bosnia had to be glued together 
again. The Dayton agreement provides that a single unified government is to be 
set up and that the dividing line between Serbs and Muslims (as well as the 
Croats in Bosnia) must be erased. That is to say, a constitutional structure is 
supposed to bridge and heal the chasm that has been opened up by four years of 
brutal religious warfare. At this time it seems unlikely that the unification of 
Bosnia will succeed just because it has been mandated by the Dayton accord. 
History, however, might yet show the Dayton agreement to be a significant 
accomplishment of American diplomacy, either because it did lead to a peaceful 
integration of Bosnia, or-more likely-because it led to a more or less peaceful 
partition. 
   History teaches us that in reality international diplomacy is usually 
motivated by a mixture of philosophies that could be viewed as a combination of 
the theory of "realism" and the theory of "institutionalism" (or of a "liberal" order 
based on consensus). As Henry Kissinger wrote, "balance-of-power systems 
have existed only rarely in human history" and that for American diplomacy the 
combination of the "moral" and the "strategic" (balance-of-power) elements 
"cannot be prescribed in the abstract."' Sometimes statesmen have sought to 
create an international organization (or a union of states) to buttress a balance-
of-power system, sometimes to advance a Wilsonian world order, sometimes 
having a combination of these two broad ideas in mind. 
   Once negotiations are underway to create such a new entity, the diplomats 
involved often become emotionally attached the institutional edifice they are 
creating. In the evolution of NATO-surely, one of the most successful alliances 
in history-the satisfaction with the progress made nourished such an 
attachment among many NATO diplomats. American and British officials were 
the principal promoters of the integrated military core of NATO, which greatly 
enhanced the alliance's military strength and helped build emotional links 
among the staff. 
   A parallel example is the creation of the European Union. American 
diplomacy, using the leverage of the Marshall Plan, helped Western Europe after 
the Second World War to overcome its pre-war economic protectionism. This
2 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York : Simon & Schuster, 1994) p. 21 and 812.
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provided a favorable environment for French, German, and other West European 
officials to create the European Common Market. But without the emotional 
attachment to a larger goal among many of these officials, the enterprise would 
at best have become a free trade area. It remained for Jean Monnet and his 
German, Belgian, and Dutch colleagues to articulate the idea of building a united 
Europe and to keep alive a sentimental attachment to this vision. Although a 
great many interesting books and articles have been written about the dramatic 
success of the movement to unite Europe, only a minority of the authors have 
fully recognized the importance of this emotional dimension.3 
   Is it possible that in the next century today's European Union will evolve 
into a single sovereign state? The continuing negotiating process in Brussels 
has not been without setbacks from the point of view of those who favor greater 
integration. But a certain momentum and sense of direction has been created by 
the past four decades, with the gradual construction of more powerful central 
institutions that the member states agreed to. The growth and eventual 
fragmentation of centrally governed, sovereign states is mysterious process for 
which human history offers many puzzling and conflicting examples. The sense 
of national belonging, or what is sometimes called nationalism, is only part of the 
story. As Elie Kedourie reminded us, "the Ottoman Empire was not a'nation', the 
Roman Empire was not a'nation', and yet they were able, as few contemporary 
states have shown themselves able, to continue for centuries, to maintain the 
cohesion of the social fabric and to attract the loyalties of men."' Sometimes, a 
national sentiment emerges suddenly and motivates soldiers and diplomats to 
fight and to bargain for a nation that they had never dreamt of before. E. J. 
Hobsbawm points out that "while the Jews, scattered throughout the world for 
some millennia, never ceased to identify themselves, wherever they were, as 
members of a special people.... at no stage.... does this seem to have implied a 
serious desire for a Jewish political state, let alone a territorial state, until a 
Jewish nationalism was invented at the very end of the nineteenth century...." 5 
   Equally puzzling can be the breaking apart of nations or sovereign states. 
Very few of the academic and government experts on the Soviet Union thought 
before 1990-let alone before the mid-1980s-that Russia might be separated
3 Jean Monnet's own story does, of course, reflect the power of emotions in shaping the ap-
 proach to European integration (Jean Monnet, Les Etats-Unis D'Europe Ont Commence, Paris : 
 Laffont, 1955). 
4 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (Oxford : Blackwell, 1993) p. 73. 
5 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1992) p. 47.
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from such entities as Ukraine (including the Crimea!), Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 
A previously unified state may break apart even without any ethnic, linguistic, 
or religious differences that would seem to justify the separation. The secession 
of Norway from Sweden in 1907 was not proposed by anyone until the 1890s.6 
How can such things be anticipated? And if the state is inherently an unstable 
entity, what does that say about the sense of loyalty and emotional attachment 
of the officials who serve the government of "their" state ? This leads us to the 
question of the influence of emotions that are rooted in past events.
Emotions Animated by Remembrance 
   The main purpose of international negotiations is to shape relations be-
tween governments or public organizations (e. g. UN, EU, WTO) for the near or 
more distant future. As noted above, negotiators are therefore influenced by 
"forward -looking" emotions, such as hope and fear. But people's emotions are 
also influenced by the memory of events that occurred in the past, or that people 
imagine to have occurred in the past. These emotive recollections influence 
human behavior in many situations ; in particular, in diplomatic negotiations-
a context where precedents and history play a large role. 
   Several "backward-looking" emotions are relevant for international nego-
tiations : 
 (1) Anger resentment, or hatred because of misdeeds, treachery, or wanton attack 
    committed by the opponent's government or its predecessors. -This sentiment 
    has considerable impact on many diplomatic relationships. It seems to 
    affect, for example, South Korea's diplomacy toward Japan. It has also 
    influenced Japan's diplomacy toward the Soviet Union because of the 
    latter's violation of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact and its retention of 
    the Northern Territories. This unpleasant memory appears to influence 
    Japanese negotiators even when dealing with today's Russia. It is more 
    easily understandable that the diplomacy of the Baltic states and Poland 
    towards Russia should be influenced by the remembrance of the Soviet 
    depredations suffered during the Stalin period. 
 (2) Emotional attachment to pieces of national territory. -Territorial disputes 
    tend to be the most difficult issues in international negotiations. When two 
    countries desire to exert sovereignty over one and the same piece of 
    territory, negotiations between them will be prolonged, and if influential 
    people on each side have some emotional attachment to the territory-no
6 E. J. Hobsbawm, ibid. p. 105.
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matter how small and worthless it might be-the risk of war is often 
imminent. Clearly, the tenacity with which government officials seek to 
hold on to or reclaim a piece of territory is not proportional to its value. It 
is not just economic assessments or strategic calculations about the future 
value of a piece of land, but an emotional attachment rooted in history that 
determines the stubbornness and sacrifice with which the conflict is 
pursued. 
  British officials easily gave up the port of Aden which could have 
become a valuable strategic base in the Gulf region (much better located 
than the British-US base on Diego Garcia). But they continued to hold on 
to the Falkland islands which are strategically and economically worthless. 
In 1982, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was so strongly motivated to 
undo the Argentine aggression and occupation of the islands that she 
accepted the risks of an extraordinarily difficult military operation 8000 
miles from the United Kingdom when a negotiated Argentine withdrawal 
could not be obtained. Many senior British officials, but by no means all, 
shared this emotive emphasis on reestablishing British sovereignty over 
these barren islands inhabited by only 2000 British citizens.? But the 
Argentine leader, General Galtieri, was even more motivated by emotions 
rooted in the past and deaf to calculations about the future. He rejected 
possibilities for a compromise that had merged from frantic US, Latin 
American, and United Nations efforts to mediate the conflict, even though 
some of the final compromise formulas might well have led to eventual 
Argentine possession of the Falklands. 
  One can think of many more examples of negotiations over some slice of 
territory in which negotiators feel they cannot "surrender an inch" even 
though the overall relations with the other side to the dispute are far more 
important than the contested piece of land. The strong insistence of 
Japanese officials that Russia must return the Northern Territories is a case 
in point. This insistence is matched by Russia's stubborn position to refuse 
negotiating about a return of these impoverished islands. 
  Recent history, however, provides a few noteworthy exceptions to this 
tendency to become emotionally attached to pieces of territory. Most of the
7 Sir Nicholas Henderson, British Ambassador in Washington at the time of the Falkland 
 crisis, wrote in an essay (published in the Economist, November 12, 1983) : "There could scarce-
 ly have been an issue since 1939 upon which the British felt so strongly, and this feeling ran 
 across party lines. No government in Britain could possibly contemplate a negotiation involv-
 ing the Argentines while they remained in occupation of the islands."
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  senior officials of the Russian Federation, it seems, are resigned to the loss 
  of the Crimea despite Russia's strong historic claims and the emotional 
  attachment of many Russians to the Crimean peninsula, where Russian 
  ethnics dominate. All the more puzzling is the inability of Russian 
  diplomats to exploit the strong emotional interest of Japanese officials in 
  recovering the Northern Territories. Russia might negotiate a substantial 
  (albeit perhaps disguised) compensation by agreeing to return the islands 
  to Japan. Another example of overcoming the emotional attachment to a 
  piece of territory is provided by the US-Panamanian negotiations over the 
  Panama Canal. Starting with the Johnson Administration, US officials 
  have been quite willing to negotiate the surrender of the Panama Canal and 
  the Canal Zone to Panama, despite the fact the United Sates had good legal 
  title to keep the Canal "in perpetuity," and even though the government of 
  Panama never exercised sovereignty over the canal and its US Zone. (The 
  state of Panama came into existence only as a result of US intervention and 
  as part of a bargain by which it agreed to give the United Stated control 
  over the Canal Zone.) 
(3) Trust and Bonding. -Diplomats who participate in prolonged conferences 
  often develop emotional bonds with each other as well as a certain 
  attachment to the ongoing conference. The conference becomes "their" 
  institution ; and the diplomats representing governments that might have 
  opposing positions begin to feel like colleagues engaged in a noble common 
  enterprise. A reasonably satisfactory experience in dealing and working 
  with these "colleagues" can engender mutual trusts Agreements that 
  were hammered out together will nourish a sense of jointly achieved 
  accomplishment. Such personal bonding and collegiality are important in 
  prolonged multilateral arms control negotiations and in complex trade 
  negotiations. 
     An interesting associated development of this personal bonding and 
  sense of collegiality is the creation of a common intellectual culture. A set 
  of agreed concepts and a common vocabulary usually emerge in arms 
  control and trade negotiations long before the work of the diplomats has 
  culminated in an agreement acceptable to their governments. Indeed, the 
  negotiating process in prolonged multilateral conferences is greatly
8 An important analysis of the interactions that build up trust in such situations is to be 
 found in I. William Zartman and M. R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale Univer-
 sity Press, 1982), pp. 27-40. 
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influenced by the common culture of ideas that serve to structure the 
issues, a culture toward which the participants develop an increasing 
emotive affinity. 
  In a way, these conferences become non-violent arenas for a contest 
among competing ideologies that seek to establish values and goals for 
ordering international relations. Thus, the goal of a comprehensive test 
ban has now emerged, after decades of argumentation and dispute, as a 
cultural norm that is almost taken for granted by most nations. It is the 
associated conditions, not the goal itself, that remain under dispute. 
Similarly, on human rights a common culture has emerged for the norms 
on racial persecution and discrimination. Today, these are strongly 
emotional issues in international negotiations and no diplomat would dare 
to disagree that racism is bad. On other aspects of human rights, however, 
one can now observe a continuing, lively debate, especially between 
European and American negotiators, on one hand, and Chinese and South-
East Asian ones, on the other. That is to say, a common culture of terms 
and concepts has not yet emerged? 
  Whether one wishes to expand or to limit the influence of common 
norms and concepts for international diplomacy depends on one's prefer-
ence for giving priority either to full national sovereignty or to a more 
uniform international order. Clearly, members of the so-called "inter-
national" staffs of multilateral organizations (such as the United Nations or 
the European Union) are supposed to work together as colleagues on the 
achievement of the organization's goals, not as negotiators on behalf of the 
nations from which they were recruited. The people who serve on inter-
national staffs, however, have differed greatly in their willingness and 
ability to serve the common goals of the international organization, rather 
than the preferences or instructions of the country from which they came. 
In past decades, it is fair to say, those who came from Western Europe, 
North America, and Japan have acted more as truly "international" officials 
than those who came from other countries. The selection process in these 
countries tends to recruit individuals who are already emotionally 
predisposed in favor of international cooperation. By contrast, "inter-
national" offrcials who had been recruited from the former Soviet bloc were
9 A recent American view of the differences is provided by David I. Hitchcock, Asian Values 
 and the United States : How Much Conflict? (Washington, D. C., Center for Strategic & Internation-
 al Studies: 1994). A Japanese view is offered by Akimasa Mitsuta, Chuka no hasso to Nihonjin 
 [The Chinese way of thinking and the Japanese] (Tokyo, Kodansha: 1993).
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  kept under tight supervision and formidable pressure by their home 
  governments to support the policy of the Soviet Union. 
(4) Feelings of loyalty and related sentiments. -No government can function 
  unless the people who serve it-or at least the key people-are motivated 
  by feelings of loyalty. A feeling of loyalty is part of a larger cluster of 
  feelings, or sentiments, that enable people to work together in competition 
  with or in opposition to other groups. This cluster includes feelings of 
  belonging to a group (being part of "we" in opposition to "them"), a sense of 
  trust towards colleagues, an emotional attachment to unifying common 
  values and symbols, such as the national flag and anthem, a code of honor, 
  historic traditions, religious beliefs. Evidently the emotions involved here 
  are largely rooted in the past. They may have been nourished by a common 
  education, memories of past common achievements, or positive feelings 
  toward parents or ancestors that blend into a sense of attachment toward 
  the national patrimony. 
     In Moscow in the autumn of 1991, representatives of the administrative 
  divisions of the Soviet Union-the so-called Soviet "republics"-negotiated 
  with senior Soviet government officials about the relationship of their 
  "republics" with the center
. Most of the senior Communist (or former 
  Communist) officials in Moscow wanted to keep the country together. 
  Despite the failed coup in August 1991, they felt a sense of loyalty toward 
  the larger Union in which they all had grown up and lived, and for which 
  many of them had fought in World War II. To be sure, Boris Yeltsin chose 
  to enhance his own political role by promoting a sovereign, independent 
  status for the Russian republic. That assertion of independence, in itself, 
  was not particularly startling. However, what surprised most experts who 
  had studied Soviet affairs and Soviet history for decades, was the sudden 
  evaporation of a sense of loyalty toward the single unified country among 
  all the delegates who negotiated about the future relationship among these 
  administrative entities (the Soviet "republics") that they represented. Even 
  though most of these administrative units had not existed as independent 
  sovereign nations in the lifetime of these delegates, or the lifetime of their 
  parents, and even though the borders of most had been arbitrarily drawn 
  by Stalin, these delegates managed to defend a new independence for their 
  "republics" and to abandon their loyalty toward that larger country which 
  had been held together and ruled for many generations from St. Petersburg 
  (in Czarist times) and from Moscow (in Soviet times).
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Emotions That Will Shape the World Order 
   Is it conceivable that negotiators representing the Prefectures of Japan 
or the Departements of France would some day meet in Tokyo, or Paris 
respectively, to make their administrative units into newly independent states ? 
We are approaching here some important questions about the emotions of people 
who are in a position to structure the relationships among states, among the sub-
units of existing states, and within international organizations. The sense of loy-
alty toward an existing nation and the desire to preserve the integrity and inde-
pendence of that nation can be destroyed by a radical upheaval in political ideol-
ogy. It is political ideology-in many cases intertwined with religious beliefs-
that provides the glue which makes national loyalty a powerful force. For 
seventy years the Soviet Union Soviet was dominated and politically inspired by 
the Communist party. When the party lost its cohesion, power, and legitimacy 
there was nothing left to hold the country together since the Communists had 
gone to great lengths to erase all legitimacy of the Czarist tradition." 
   The Communist party in China is losing its power, ideological relevance, and 
cohesion far more slowly and less dramatically than did the Soviet Communist 
party. Nonetheless, the process of weakening the center has gone so far that the 
authorities in Beijing now continuously have to negotiate with provincial 
authorities on tax revenues, economic policy, and other issues. After a future 
successsion crisis in Beijing, some officials representing provincial power centers 
might feel greater loyalty to their local constituency than to a fractured and 
ideologically bereft national government Beliing's adamant position on Taiwan 
may reflect a sense of insecurity about national cohesion. 
   The break-up of several sovereign states into smaller sovereign states in 
this decade has been the result of negotiation, not of wars fought for secession. 
In addition to the Soviet Union, the break-up of Czechoslovakia was a negotiated 
outcome, as was the separation of Macedonia from Yugoslavia. And if Quebec 
should separate from Canada, that outcome would also be reached through
10 An excellent assessment of the end of Soviet Communism can be found in the special issue 
 of The National Interest, "The Strange Death of Soviet Communism," Number 31, Spring 1993. 
 Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. wrote in that issue : "Having undermined its own legitimacy at the Feb-
 ruary [1990] Plenum, the Party voted at its Twenty-Eighth (and last) Congress in July 1990 
 to destroy itself organizationally by giving up the Party's supervision of the government, by 
 removing all government officials (except Gorbachev) from the Politburo, and by filling that 
 body with non-entities" (p. 54). Then, after the failed coup in August 1991, Gorbachev was total-
 ly descredited and Yeltsin promoted (as note above, for his own reasons) the independence of 
 the largest unit with the USSR That left nothing in the center toward which the representa-
 tives of the other Soviet Republics could feel a sense of loyality.
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negotiation. At the same time, other independent nations have engaged in 
prolonged and complex negotiations to form a larger union. The most notable 
case, of course, is the European Union. The more recent North American Free 
Trade Area represents a far more limited from of integration than the European 
Union. Slowly, however, the world of today is becoming enmeshed in a global 
web of trade and financial networks, communications links, environmental 
interdependence, and cultural interactions that restrict national sovereignty to 
some degree and lead to mixed emotions among the diplomats and official of all 
the governments involved. Many British government leaders and officials, for 
example, seek to limit the process of European integration. In the United States, 
opinion is divided on whether to strengthen international organizations or to 
protect and reaffirm America's sovereign independence. 
   In recent decades, many political scientists and international relations 
experts have written about the growing global interdependence caused by the 
environmental impact of industrialization, security problems, demographic 
pressures, and an increasingly integrated world economy. German, Scandina-
vian, and American writers, especially, have suggested that the role of nation 
states will diminish and that the emerging worldwide problems will require 
global political structures that can develop common policies and seek to 
implement new solutions.11 
   What most of these writings neglect, however, is the emotional dimension of 
the political process that seeks to build government structures for the world as 
a whole which would increasingly have to perform functions now the 
responsibility of nation states. By and large, the advocates of stronger global 
organizations are motivated by emotions that concern the future-fear of 
nuclear proliferation, concerns about population pressures, hopes for controlling 
global warming, and so on. By contrast, the statesmen and diplomats who seek 
to preserve the untrammeled national sovereignty of their countries are 
motivated by emotions that relate to things in the past-a sentiment of national 
belonging, a desire of people to preserve their cultural environment, a sense of 
loyalty toward the existing national government.
11 A small selection of these writings is : The World Commission on Environment and Develop-
 ment, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) ; Commission on Global 
 Governance, Our Global Neighborhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) ; Stanley 
 Hoffmann, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism," Foreign Policy, vol. 98, Spring 1995, pp. 159-
 177, Rolf Knieper, Nationale Souveraenitaet (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1991) ; Karl Kaiser & 
 Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.), Die Neue Weltpolitik (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung, 
 1995) ; Yehezkel Dror, Ist die Erde Noch Regierbar? (a report to the Club of Rome, Munich: 
 Bertelsmann, 1995) ; this book has an extensive international bibliography.
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   In the normal flow of international negotiations, these conflicting emotions 
nudge decisions almost imperceptibly. At one point they might induce a 
diplomat to support a small step toward greater international cooperation, at 
another point they might motivate a diplomat to oppose a decision that would 
detract from his nation's freedom of action. The clash of these emotions becomes 
more apparent only in a crisis. And in most crises, the emotions animated by 
things in the past tend to win out over the emotions animated by ideas about the 
future. It takes a leader of extraordinary forcefulness-and often ruthlessness-
to prevail with his vision about the future against colleagues or opponents who 
are motivated by emotions that are rooted in the past. Lenin was such a person 
when in 1917 he seized power, engineered the destruction of the Czarist tra-
ditions, and imposed upon Russia a totally new social and economic order. 
   By contrast, the Socialist parties in Europe in 1914 were too weak to 
promote the principles of the Second International (the program approved by 
European Socialist leaders) that called for halting the outbreak of World War I. 
The Socialist parties of the European states could not negotiate a united position 
in August 1914 against the war. Each party rationalized in its internal delib-
erations that its own nation was embarking on a defensive war, and according to 
previous Socialist peace resolutions defensive wars were permissible." This 
crisis illustrates that the emotions of nationalism and of things of the past can 
prevail over the hopes for a new, peaceful future. 
   In June 1940, days before the final defeat of France by Nazi Germany, British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill tried to negotiate with the French Premier, 
Paul Reynaud, a deal inspired clearly by emotions and visions about the future. 
Churchill proposed to the French government an "indissoluble union" of France 
and Great Britain ; but the French government (at that time huddled in Bor-
deaux, its last refuge from the advancing German army) could not embrace the 
future-oriented sentiments of Churchill. The emotions rooted in past things 
prevailed and the French Council of Ministers rejected Churchill's proposal." 
Remarkably, after World War II it was the British who refused for more than ten 
years to join with France in the integration of Europe, the endeavor that has 
since led-with British participation-to the creation of the European Uninon.
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), pp. 
  128-137. 
13 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
 1949) pp. 186, 205-212. Churchill wrote after the war : "Rarely has so generous a proposal en-
 countered so hostile a reception .... Most [French ministers] were wholly unprepared to re-
 ceive such far-reaching themes." Some of the French complained that it was a scheme to put 
 France in tutelage, or to carry off her colonial empire. (Ibid. pp. 212-213.)
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